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Path Break versus Path Drift:  
A Comparative Approach to Explain Variations in Institutional Effects on Economic Growth 
 
 
Abstract 
This study introduces a comprehensive model of institutional grafting wherein cultural, structural, and 
political forces shape new legal institutions. The model is used to argue that a country’s growth rates are a 
function of the distance that the new legal institutions develop to these three forces. We further argue that 
the distance’s size varies depending on the mode of institutional change: drift phase or path break. We 
demonstrate that the distance is usually large during a path break but tends to be significantly smaller for 
institutions emerging in the drift phase. As such, the new legal institutions strongly impact economic 
growth in the drift phase and only modestly influence growth rates during institutional path change. In the 
latter case, the political dimension’s quality determines the success of both a country’s growth trajectories 
and institutional reforms. These propositions are tested empirically based on a sample of 106 countries 
derived from the POLITY IV Project’s website.  
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Path Break versus Path Drift:  
A Comparative Approach to Explain Variations in Institutional Effects on Economic Growth 
 
Growth theory asserts that good formal institutions are conducive to rapid economic development (see 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012 for an overview). Empirical research largely supports this claim but 
suggests that the direction and strength of institutional impacts on growth rates may vary depending 
mainly on the maturity level of formal institutions (Barro, 1997; Przeworski & Limongi, 1993) or a 
country’s level of economic prosperity (Eicher & Leukert, 2009; Lee & Kim, 2009). Our study argues 
that the mode of institution building can also contribute to explaining this variation. By offering a 
theoretical model of institutional grafting, we identify possible implications for how formal institutions 
impact a country’s growth patterns depending on the mode of their formation: either path-drifting or path-
breaking.  
By limiting the scope of our analysis to legal institutions, we demonstrate that formal institutions 
are a strong predictor of a country’s economic growth when the country’s institutional change evolves 
along the established institutional path. When legal institutional frameworks undergo radical and 
profound reforms aimed at breaking into a new institutional path, they only marginally influence growth 
rates. In the latter case, the political dimension’s quality predefines the success of both economic growth 
and institutional reforms. By determining the new legal institutions’ maturity levels and their congruence 
with local cultures or economic structures, the political dimension shapes the country’s growth patterns 
during or immediately after transitioning to a new institutional path.  
 
 Literature Review and Extension  
Institutional economics distinguishes between two modes of institutional grafting: drift/evolution and 
critical junctures (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). In the drift phase, or during evolutionary institutional 
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change, rules emerge from the bottom up and evolve spontaneously from cultural values and societal 
norms with the government only formalizing what is already primarily shaped by individual attitudes 
(Easterly, 2008). In this case, institutional change is gradual in nature and constrained by previous 
institutions, while also expected to be additive and not too ambitious (Platteau, 1996). Drastic changes in 
the existing institutions are believed to harm the economy, even if there is no obvious reason for such 
institutions to exist (Easterly, 2008). Institutions are deemed unique to a society and closely linked to its 
history, which is why societies are expected to substantially diverge in their formal institutions both in the 
short and long run (Boudreaux & Alicia, 2007).   
By contrast, path-breaking institutional change, or critical junctures, abruptly alters the entire 
institutional framework through a top-down design of new institutions. Institutions are viewed as written 
laws devised by political leaders (Easterly, 2008). Drastic changes in the existing institutional framework 
is deemed possible, whereas determining an optimal set of institutions that can be introduced in any 
country is seen as attainable (Boudreaux & Alicia, 2007). The path-breaking approach denies the 
historical link to the past or culture in the institution building process by suggesting that there might be 
“one globally unique best set of institutions, towards which all societies are thought to be developing” 
(Easterly, 2008). Replicating institutions from more advanced societies to less advanced societies is hence 
considered feasible and efficient.  
We argue that the mode of institution building can determine how formal institutions impact 
economic growth. We adopt Portes’s sociological model of institutional grafting (2006) as a base 
analytical framework for juxtaposing how drift-phase and path-breaking institutional reforms influence 
growth rates. According to Portes (2006), formal institutions are influenced by a dual set of forces. On the 
one hand, a country’s culture consists of values and norms that dictate how economic agents and authority 
figures should conduct themselves. On the other hand, a country’s social structure includes power and 
elites (who control that power) who are embedded within a certain class structure with a clearly specified 
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status hierarchy. Portes (2006) further suggests that regardless under which mode institutions are formed, 
they must be compatible with the culture and social structure to ensure a successful institutional creation. 
If institutions emerge spontaneously from a country’s social norms, customs, beliefs or traditions 
(Easterly, 2008), dominant classes and political elites must be persuaded or compelled to legalize them 
(Portes, 2006). If imposed by political elites, institutional change must presuppose a shift in the 
underlying values to enable its cultural acceptance (Portes, 2006).   
We further expand this approach by arguing that successful legal institution formation or 
transformation is embedded within a three-dimensional framework, and any incongruence with it may 
potentially create three forces of opposition to a country’s economic growth. The first dimension is 
culture (as in Portes, 2006), similar to North’s concept of informal institutions (North, 1990). It includes 
prevalent values/norms that dictate right and wrong, as well as one’s behavioral compliance with these 
values/norms. The second dimension is economic structure, which describes the nature of economic 
arrangements and economic infrastructure in a country within which economic transactions are 
undertaken. It includes financial and banking systems, taxation, labor market institutions, etc. The third 
dimension is political, where we distinguish between (1) political elites who deal with formalizing 
institutions (as in Portes, 2006) and (2) political institutions whose rules formalize how prevailing 
political interests are organized into a legal framework and according to which new legal institutions are 
introduced.  
We also adopt Portes’s assumption that legal institutions should be commensurate with the logic 
of all three dimensions in order to function effectively and promote economic growth. We expect that the 
odds of achieving the needed congruence between legal institutions and the three dimensions may vary 
across the modes of institutional change (drift/evolution and path-breaking/critical junctures). In order to 
identify possible levels of such incongruence for each of the two cases, we analyze the logic of institution 
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building inherent to each of the modes by applying the three-dimensional framework of institutional 
grafting.  
More specifically, the drift-phase institutional change can be described as follows. As economic 
agents operate, they accumulate knowledge and experience, which leads to technological advancements 
and further promotes the division of labor (Davis, 2010). This changes how a country organizes its 
production processes and shifts the structural dimension by introducing new industries, competition 
terms, pricing strategies, and conditions of resource allocation across various economic sectors. Profound 
change in the technological and economic domains leads economic agents to transform their thinking and 
value systems. As a result, existing legal institutions are no longer adequate or commensurate with the 
new economic structure and prevalent cultures, raising market transaction costs (North, 1990). 
Contractual arrangements create demand for institutional change to lower transaction costs to exploit new 
opportunities (Pejovich, 1999). To overcome the existing inconsistencies, economic agents introduce 
informal changes (Eggertsson, 1997) among formal “rules of the game” to make the institutional 
framework more flexible. If they are efficient and compatible with the interests of political elites, these 
changes are captured by the political dimension, which formalizes and legalizes them through the existing 
political institutions (Portes, 2006). In this way, the informal changes acquire the status of formal 
institutions. Private international commercial law provides an example of the drift-phase institutional 
grafting (Boettke, Coyne, & Leeson,  2008): The development of cross-culture exchange in 11th and 
12th-century Europe led to the spontaneous formation of the lex mercatoria, an informal system of 
customary law rooted in international commercial norms (Boettke et al., 2008). These informal 
institutions appeared to be effective and were later formalized into international commercial law.  
The drift-phase institutional change’s properties can be summarized as follows. First, since 
institutional change is usually promoted by economic agents through a bottom-up approach, the new legal 
institutions should reflect values, norms, and preferences that are dominant among economic agents and 
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are therefore congruent with the cultural dimension. Second, legal institutions should be compatible with 
the existing economic structure, since changes in the old institutions primarily occur as a reaction to 
economic or technologic shifts. Third, political elites have a minor role in institution creation that is 
restricted to formalizing the new institutions. The success of institutional reforms depends on how rapidly 
and effectively political institutions adopt informal changes to legal institutions corresponding to the new 
cultural and structural conditions.  
The logic of path-breaking institutional reforms occurring at critical junctures differs 
substantially from the drift-phase logic. With path-breaking institutional change, shifts in a country’s 
political system, often triggered by a political regime change, precede changes in its economic system. 
Usually, the economic crisis caused by the previous regime’s shortcomings justifies political elites in 
introducing essential alterations in both political and economic domains (Olson, 1982). Alternatively, if 
the population is dissatisfied with the current regime, citizens may demand changes in both political and 
economic systems even if the incumbent elites resist such reforms. Radical political change can occur 
either through revolutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), as recent events in the Arabic world 
demonstrate, or in a peaceful manner without wars and coups (Olson, 1982), as in the majority of post-
communist countries during the collapse of socialism (Aslund, 2007).  
The new political regime transforms the logic of economic processes and requires profound and 
radical reforms in the economic and structural systems’ organization. The altered political and economic 
logic, in turn, requires adjusting the legal institutional framework, and a new set of legal institutions is 
often immediately introduced. Many pitfalls exist at various stages of carrying out institutional reforms 
when breaking into a new institutional path. First, the political power shift and the new political 
institutions’ initial immaturity may create temporary power vacuums and opportunities for political or 
economic elites to seek rents through the new legal institutional framework (Aslund, 2007). Second, even 
if this is not the case and the population’s interests dominate during the institutional grafting process, the 
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new legal institutions’ quality depends on whether the political elites, incumbent to handle the 
institutional grafting, are sufficiently familiar with the new political and economic regimes and relevant 
legal rules. Third, since such knowledge and skills are often missing, building a new institutional 
framework will likely be limited to borrowing legal rules from countries with political and economic 
orders similar to those desired. As a result, the new legal institutions become imposed from without 
(Pejovich, 1999), which may lead to three forms of incongruence.  
First, implanting foreign institutions into another local context may disrupt their congruence with 
characteristics of the existing cultural dimension (Boettke et al., 2008; Kyriazis & Zouboulakis, 2005; 
Portes, 2006). Since culture is unique and slow to change, economic agents may perceive and interpret the 
new legal rules through a prism of the former regime’s values. Because of this, economic agents might 
assign meanings to the new laws that are different from their actual context (Portes, 2006), causing the 
newly introduced legal institutions to mutate or to be only marginally enforced (Portes, 2006).  
Second, a similar incongruence may emerge between the new legal institutions and the local 
structural dimension. Political regime change requires profound economic and structural reforms that can 
be constrained by the local economy’s specificities or by politicians failing to introduce needed reforms. 
New legal rules may hence conflict with the country’s former economic structure, as occurred when 
Western industrial legislation was introduced in the former Soviet Union countries. Designed for 
postindustrial societies with mostly medium and small businesses, Western laws proved inefficient for 
many soviet economies characterized by an overrepresentation of large (state) enterprises.  
Third, by copying more advanced societies’ legal institutions, the government risks an imbalance 
between the new legal institutional framework and local political interests, causing incongruence between 
the political dimension and legal institutions. This leads to introducing constant changes to the new legal 
framework and presents opportunities for rent-seeking by political or economic elites, which can severely 
8 
 
destabilize a country’s local economy. Such rent-seeking during Russia’s transition to capitalism added 
up to a staggering of 55-75% of GNP (Aslund, 2007).  
The learning experience should minimize or eliminate every kind of incongruence (Nelson & 
Sampat, 2001). If political elites design and introduce adjustment policies during the transition period, the 
incompatibility between the new legal institutions and political interests or economic structures can be 
gradually narrowed. Similarly, if economic actors learn that adapting to the new legal institutions can 
expand their opportunity set, they may change their cultural values and behaviors. For instance, post-
communist countries in which new democratic governments successfully introduced economic and legal 
reforms experienced a rise in pro-democratic attitudes among citizens (Aslund, 2007) and in support for a 
free-market economy (Aslund, 2007). East-European countries’ transition from socialism to capitalism 
and Japan’s post-war reconstruction are good examples of the path-breaking approach to institutional 
grafting (Boettke et al., 2008). Both experienced profound changes in their political regime, major 
economic rules, and key legislation.  
The path-breaking institutional grafting’s properties can be summarized as follows. First, the 
top-down approach to implementing radical institutional reforms may create incongruence between the 
new legal institutions and the prevalent cultures, at least at the initial reform stage. Second, the local 
economy’s specificities can cause incongruence between the new legal institutions and the structural 
dimension. Third, the role of political elites is superior and is not confined to legalizing new institutions 
but extends to their selection, design, introduction, and subsequent adjustment to the current cultural and 
structural dimensions. The quality of new legal institutions and their congruence with the three 
dimensions might depend on the quality of the country’s political change and the professionalism of 
political elites incumbent to handle the institutional grafting under the new conditions.  
Our juxtaposition hence suggests that the odds of ensuring congruence between the new legal 
institutions and the three dimensions differ substantially for the two modes of institutional change. This 
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allows us to argue that economies might be endowed with different opportunity sets for growth, 
depending on the mode of institutional grafting through which the new legal institutional framework is 
introduced: drift/evolution or path-breaking/critical junctures. We summarize these differences in five 
propositions outlined below: 
Proposition 1: Since legal institutions stemming from the drift phase are more congruent with 
the three dimensions than legal institutions introduced through path-breaking institutional reforms, drift-
phase institutions are expected to foster economic growth more effectively. When congruence exists, 
economic agents encounter fewer frictions during their interactions, making more transactions possible 
and leading to higher economic growth. We hence formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1(a): Path-breaking institutional change produces legal institutions that develop 
greater incongruence to the three dimensions than in the drift phase. 
Hypothesis 1(b):  The incongruence’s negative impact on growth rates is greater during path-
breaking institutional change than in the drift phase. 
Hypothesis 1(c): Legal institutions’ positive impact on economic growth is greater during the 
drift phase than during path-breaking institutional change.  
 
Proposition 2: Drift-phase institutional change restricts the role of political elites and political 
institutions to capturing and formalizing alterations promoted by economic agents. By contrast, pursuing 
a new institutional path requires the political dimension to implement not only novel institutional reforms 
but also considerable changes to all three dimensions: political, structural, and cultural. Due to the 
political dimension’s increased role in handling the transition, we expect that the political dimension’s 
impact on growth rates is greater for path-breaking countries than for path-drifting countries. This is 
especially true in the case of political elites who design and manage the transition process. By contrast, 
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economies of the drift phase should be more sensitive to the quality of their political institutions through 
which their (usually less profound and more cumulative) bottom-up institutional change is formalized. 
We hence anticipate that  
 
Hypothesis 2: The political dimension’s positive impact on economic growth is greater during 
path-breaking institutional change than in the drift phase. 
 
We further suggest that there are three aspects that can explain differences between the two 
modes of institutional grafting regarding the political dimension’s role in fostering economic growth: (a) 
defining the new legal institutions’ quality (see Property 3), (b) determining the extent of incongruence 
between the new legal institutions and the cultural or structural dimensions (see Property 4), and (c) 
influencing how any incongruence impacts economic growth (see Property 5).  
Proposition 3: During path-breaking institutional change, legal institutions’ quality depends on 
the political dimension to a greater extent than during a drift-phase institutional evolution. The top-down 
nature of path-breaking institutional reforms makes the new legal institutions a function of how savvy 
political elites are in managing the institutional grafting process (the choice of an optimal number of laws, 
clarity of law formulations, etc.). The political institutions’ quality in turn determines how effectively and 
efficiently the new legal framework, designed by political elites, is introduced and enforced. B contrast, 
the drift mode’s bottom-up evolution of legal institutions presupposes a weaker dependence of the legal 
institutions’ quality on the political dimension. We hence expect that 
 
Hypothesis 3: The political dimension’s positive impact on the quality of legal institutions and 
the overall legal institutional change is greater during path-breaking institutional change than in 
the drift phase. 
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Proposition 4: The ultimate extent of incongruence between the new legal institutions and the 
cultural and structural dimensions is more a function of the political dimension’s quality in the countries 
changing institutional path than in the countries drifting along the established institutional path. Due to a 
top-down design of legal rules during path-break, the political dimension determines whether the new 
legal institutions reflect a consistent logic with that of economic structures and dominant cultural values. 
During the drift-phase, institutional change in contrast emerges from a society’s social norms, customs, 
beliefs or traditions as a reaction to economic shifts or technological innovation, thereby limiting the 
political dimension’s role in building a legal institutional framework. This enables greater independence 
of the new legal institutions’ congruence with the cultural and structural dimension from political elites 
and political institutions. We hence anticipate that  
 
Hypothesis 4: The political dimension’s impact on the extent of incongruence between legal 
institutions and the cultural or structural dimensions is greater during path-breaking institutional 
change than in the drift phase. 
 
Proposition 5: Since incongruence between legal institutions and cultural and structural 
dimensions are more likely to emerge during a path break, the need for reforms mitigating such 
incongruence’s negative impact on economic growth is expected to be greater when a country changes its 
institutional path. By contrast, path-drift institutional reforms seldom require such adaptation measures, 
because their legal institutions usually emerge from existing economic structures and cultures. Since such 
adaptation measures or reforms are designed and implemented by the political dimension, we hypothesize 
that  
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Hypothesis 5: The incongruence’s negative impact on growth rates is smaller when the political 
dimension is of better quality. This is even more so for path-breaking institutional change than 
for drift-phase institutional change. 
 
Data and Method Description 
To test our hypotheses, we rely on Eicher’s and Leukert’s (2009) approach of splitting the sample into 
subsamples. In forming our subsamples, we use the idea that path-breaking institutional change 
presupposes a profound transformation of the entire institutional framework resulted from a political 
regime change. To identify whether a country has experienced recent changes in its political regime, we 
use the POLITY IV Project’s website (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), which provides 
information about political regime characteristics and transitions between 1800 and 2015 with a polity 
score for a wide range of countries. The values of a country’s annual polity score range from -10 to 10, 
with values 6 and above denoting full democracy and -6 and below denoting full autocracy. In our 
analysis, a country has experienced a political regime change if: (1) polity score values shifted from at 
least -6 or below to at least 6 and above; (2) this change is rapid and occurred within a few years; (3) this 
change occurred after 1980. Any earlier transition is expected to produce institutions that would adhere to 
the local structural and cultural characteristics through the learning process and eliminate any 
incongruence. In this case, the new formal institutions would follow a drift-phase path in their maturation 
process; (4) the change is stable with no signs of reverting to the previous regime in the following years; 
(5) there have not been persistent fluctuations in the regime trend of more than 3 points since 1980. 
Regime trend fluctuations denote political instability, which is a separate issue with respect to growth 
analysis and has both positive and negative effects on economic development (Jong-A-Pin, 2009).  
Based on the polity score trends, we form two subsamples (see Appendix 1): path-breaking and 
path-drifting (due to space limits, we do not provide a country choice description but can send it upon 
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request). Our path-breaking subsample includes 51 countries that transitioned to a different political 
regime involving a radical change in political and economic rules. The selected countries are 
heterogeneous in their starting points. This does not contradict the purpose of our analysis since the 
quantitative impact of initial conditions on the selection of reforms and rates of economic growth is small 
and tends to rapidly decline over time (Berg, Borensztein, Sahay, & Zettelmeyer, 1999; Falcetti et al., 
2000).  
Our drift subsample is limited to 55 countries that have not experienced political regime change 
or have experienced profound but gradual change (each stage of change not being greater than a 3-point 
fluctuation in the polity score). These countries are also heterogeneous in their characteristics and include 
both democracies and autocracies, as well as developed and developing economies.  
We are primarily interested in comparing how formal legal and political institutions impact 
economic growth for the two country groups: path drift versus path break. The quality of legal institutions 
is approximated through a contract enforcement and property rights protection index sourced from the 
Economic Freedom of the World online data (see http://www.freetheworld.com/ for a detailed description 
of the index composition). The values vary from 1 (bad legal institutions) to 10 (good legal institutions). 
Formal institutions are considered to be good when they are clearly defined and well-enforced, which 
means that the institutional scores are closer to 10.  
The political dimension's quality is measured through the control of corruption in government, 
government effectiveness, the quality of regulation, and voice and accountability. All political indexes are 
sourced from the World Bank Group database and vary from -2.5 (bad political situation) to 2.5 (ideal 
political situation). The four indexes are highly correlated, with the voice and accountability index 
showing the greatest uniqueness in its variance (due to space limits, we do not report factor loading and 
uniqueness variances but can send them upon request). We use this index to describe democratic settings’ 
quality in a country and hence the quality of political institutions. The three remaining indexes are 
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combined by using the STATA predict option for factor analysis to construct a single measure 
approximating the quality of political elites and its policymaking.  
In measuring the cultural dimension, we draw upon the idea that economic growth is sensitive to 
individualistic or collectivist cultures (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). Individualism emphasizes 
personal freedom and achievement by awarding social status to personal accomplishments, such as 
important discoveries, innovations, etc., thereby promoting economic growth. Collectivism encourages 
conformity and discourages individuals from standing out (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2011), which 
negatively impacts a country’s growth rates. Since we do not have yearly data on individualism and 
collectivism, we link the culture to the concept of collective action: Individualism is expected to make 
collective action more difficult than collectivism, as individuals pursue their own goals without 
internalising collective interests (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2011). As such, we use a centralized 
collective bargaining index to approximate how collectivist or individualistic a culture is. This index is 
sourced from the Economic Freedom of the World website (see http://www.freetheworld.com/ for a 
detailed description of the index composition), with the values varying from 1 “more collectivist culture” 
to 10 “more individualistic culture”. 
We operationalize the structural dimension through the following set of Economic Freedom of 
the World index groups: private sector credit, capital controls, foreign ownership/investment restrictions, 
and starting a business (see http://www.freetheworld.com/ for a detailed description of the index 
composition). By using the STATA predict option for factor analysis, we further combine the selected 
items into a single construct with values ranging between 0 “underdeveloped economic structure” and 1 
“well-developed economic structure”. 
The legal institutional scores and the three dimensions' variables are rescaled to vary between 0 
and 1. The variables’ minimum and maximum values from the pooled sample are used as benchmarks for 
rescaling. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables. 
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[insert Table 1 here] 
 
To test our hypotheses empirically, we use the dynamic GMM method proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). The procedure for applying this technique is 
well-documented by Pääkkönen (2010) or Lee and Kim (2009). It requires that the equation is first-
differenced to eliminate the heterogeneity in production function. Then, an instrumental variable method 
is applied on the differenced model, with lagged values of the endogenous variables used as instruments 
for the variables themselves. To avoid an overfitting bias, we often restrict instruments to only few lags of 
the respective variables. We further use the STATA collapse sub-option to create one instrument for each 
variable and lag distance rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance. We also add the 
sub-options small to request small-sample corrections to the covariance matrix estimate. We calculate a 
two step estimator instead of a one step. Additionally, we use the sub-option noleveleq that invokes 
difference instead of system GMM. To demonstrate the correctness of the model, we report the number of 
instruments generated by the model, the results from a Hansen overidentification test, and the Arellano-
Bond test for AR(2) serial correlation in the residuals. STATA command extabond2 is used for calculating 
the model parameters.  
We utilize yearly data for the period from 1996 to 2014. We apply the same model to both 
subsamples while ensuring that a standard set of conditioning variables and standard periods are used. 
Our base growth model consists of two variables: investment and inflation. Investment is included, since 
it is the key predictor in the majority of growth models. Macroeconomic stability is, in turn, considered a 
precondition for economic recovery during transition to a new institutional path (Fischer, Sahay, & Vegh, 
1996). Hence, the base model is:  
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + εit                                                                                                                                 (1) 
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Where Yit is a measure of economic development limited to economic growth and 
operationalized through an annual real GDP growth rate, Yit-1 is one-period-lagged economic growth. K 
stands for the investment in physical capital measured through gross capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP. MS represents macroeconomic stability captured by annual consumer price inflation. The main 
source for the above variables is the World Bank electronic database.  
We begin the analysis by calculating incongruence between legal institutions and the three 
dimensions as: Distance = [(Dimensions' value - Legal institutional index) /Legal institutional index]. We 
further rescale their values to vary between 0 and 1.  
The distance variables’ impact on growth rates are modeled as: 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3D_Culture it + β4D_Structureit + β5D_Politicsit + εit          (2)                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Where D_ is a measure of the distance between the quality of a country's legal institutions and 
one of the three dimensions.  
We further test the hypotheses about variations in the impact of legal and political scores on 
economic growth between the two subsamples. As such, we include formal legal institutions (LI) into the 
base model:                                                           
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3LIit + εit                                                                                                                     (3) 
Similarly, we include political dimension indexes (PI) into the base model: 
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3PIit + εit                                                                                                                    (4)                                                                   
At this stage of the analysis, we are able to compare the coefficient estimates of the legal 
institutional variable, LI, and the political dimension variables, PI, between the path-drifting and path-
breaking subsamples.  
To explore how the political dimension impacts legal institutional change, we run the following 
model:  
LI_change it=αLIit-1 + ρ1Life_expectit + ρ2PIit + μit                                                                                                             (5) 
17 
 
Where LI_change stands for an annual change in the legal institutional index during the period 
analyzed and is calculated as [(Legal Institutional Index in year t - Legal Institutional Index in year (t-1)] / 
Legal Institutional Index in year (t-1)]. LI it-1 is a lagged value of the legal institutional index, PI is 
political dimension scores, and Life_expect stands for life expectancy (as in Acemoglu, Johnson, & 
Robinson, 2001; Islam, 2004). Since formal institutions may influence the quality of life and impact life 
expectancy, we insert the life expectancy variable into the gmmstyle option and instrument it with the 
lagged values of the variable itself. We also use latitude as a strictly exogenous instrument and include it 
in the ivstyle option. 
The political dimension’s impact on the distance that the new legal institutions develop to the 
cultural and structural dimensions is modeled as:  
D_variablesit = D_variablesit-1 + ρ1Life_expectit + ρ2PIit + μit                                                                                 (6)                                                                                
Where D_variables are the distances that legal institutions develop to the cultural and structural 
dimensions. D_variablesit-1 is a lagged value of the distance variables, PI is political dimension indexes, 
and Life_expect stands for life expectancy.  
The political dimension’s impact on the relationship between the distance variables and growth 
rates are modeled as:  
lnYit =αlnYit-1 + β1lnKit + β2lnMSit + β3PIit + β4D_Culture it + β5D_Structureit + β6PI*D_Cultureit 
+ β7PI*D_Structureit + εit                                                                                                                                                                                              (7) 
Where PI*D_Culture and PI*D_Structure are interaction terms between the political indexes 
and the distance that legal institutions develop to the culture or economic structure respectively. Other 
variables are as described above. 
 
Empirical Results  
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Table 2 reports results supporting the key line of our argumentation (see hypothesis 1(a)) that the 
incongruence between legal institutions and the three dimensions depends on the mode of institutional 
change. The distance variables’ values are significantly greater for the path-breaking subsample than for 
the path-drifting subsample. Table 3 demonstrates that any incongruence between legal institutions and 
the three dimensions is a negative factor of economic growth, and this is mainly so for the path-breaking 
countries. This is in line with hypothesis 1(b). When breaking into a new institutional path, a country’s 
growth rates are highly sensitive to the distance that the new legal institutions develop to the quality of 
political elites. Also, incongruence between path-breaking legal institutions and the cultural dimension 
may considerably diminish economic growth rates. For path-drifting countries, the only danger to 
economic growth is when legal institutions veer away from existing cultural values.  
 
[insert Table 2 and Table 3 here] 
 
As expected, the impact of legal indexes on economic growth strongly varies between the path-
drifting and path-breaking subsamples (see table 4). Legal institutions are instrumental to growth rates of 
economies in the drift phase, whereas this relationship is considerably weaker during a path break. This is 
consistent with hypothesis 1(c). These results stand up to the alternative model specification choices and 
to the exclusion of resource-rich countries from the analysis.  
Our results reported in Tables 5 and 6 also point out to a variation in how the political dimension 
impacts economic growth between the two subsamples, supporting Hypothesis 2. Economies operating 
within a path-breaking institutional framework are more sensitive to the quality of their political elites, 
whereas the drift-sample economies need strong political institutions to grow faster. Note that in both 
subsamples, the political dimension’s impact on growth rates is substantially greater than the legal 
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institutional scores’ impact. The results also remain robust to alternative model specification choices or to 
the exclusion of resource rich countries from the subsamples. 
 
[insert Table 4 and Table 5 and Table 6 here] 
 
To disentangle the political dimension’s role in fostering economic growth, we analyze the 
proposed three channels. First, our empirical results confirm hypothesis 3 that the path-breaking 
institutional grafting or change is sensitive to the political dimension’s quality (see table 7). We do not 
find any positive relationship between the political dimension and legal institutional scores or their 
change for the drift sample. Rather, our results suggest that when countries drift along established 
institutional paths, a strong political dimension can constrain productive institutional development. 
Second, tables 8 and 9 provide support for hypothesis 4. The newly introduced legal institutions shift 
closer to the cultural and structural dimensions when the political dimension is stronger, especially in the 
path-breaking subsample. Third, table 10 suggests that even when distances between the new legal 
institutions and the two above dimensions persist, their negative impact on economic growth can be offset 
with a superior political dimension. The positive interaction terms support the rationale presented in 
hypothesis 5. Surprisingly, this positive interaction is stronger in the path-drifting than in the path-
breaking subsample. Overall, this three channel analysis demonstrates that the political dimension should 
restrict its role when bottom-up institutional change evolves. When a country changes its institutional 
path, the political dimension essentially shapes the legal institutional change trajectory, the extent of 
incongruence between new legal institutions and existing cultures and economic structures, and how 
significantly this incongruence affects a country’s economic growth patterns. 
 
[insert Table 7 and Table 8 and Table 9 and Table 10 here] 
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Conclusion and Discussion 
We demonstrate that drift-phase institutional change produces legal institutions that are congruent with 
the logic of this study’s three dimensions: cultural, structural, and political. By contrast, path-breaking 
institutional change may lead institutions to develop large distances to these dimensions. Because of these 
distances, the quality of legal institutions might only marginally impact growth rates of economies 
moving to a new institutional path. Rather, a country’s economic growth is strongly impacted by the 
quality of its political dimension, especially its political elites and their policymaking. Our analysis 
demonstrates that during a path break, the political dimension determines legal institutional change 
dynamics, the extent of incongruence between new legal institutions and the prevalent cultures and 
economic structures, and whether any incongruence influences economic growth rates during and after 
the transition to a new institutional path.  
When legal institutions are created from the bottom up during a path drift, the political 
dimension in contrast has less impact on the country’s economic development, while allowing the 
existence of a strong relationship between legal institutional scores and growth rates. Here, the political 
dimension’s role is relatively passive and limited to ensuring good political institutions that can 
effectively capture and formalize informal changes promoted by economic agents. A strong political elite 
and their policymaking can harm drift-phase economies if they directly intervene in the institutional 
change process. They can only foster economic growth by mitigating the negative impacts of 
incongruence between legal institutions and cultural or economic structures, if such incongruence 
emerges.   
Future research can eliminate two major limitations of our study. First, the analysis could 
integrate countries with unstable regime trends. Second, alternative economic development measures 
could demonstrate our findings’ robustness regarding how the mode of institution building impacts 
economic progress throughout the world. 
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 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables Used in the Analysis. 
 
VARIABLES No. of 
observations 
Mean SD Min. Max. 
The path-drifting subsample       
GDP per capita growth 947 2.363 4.590 -15.146 61.009 
Legal institutions  659 0.672 0.161 0.116 0.962 
The political dimension       
Political institutions 880 0.531 0.243 0.056 0.865 
Political elites 880 0.500 0.198 0.098 0.819 
The cultural dimension  608 0.613 0.164 0.183 0.883 
The structural dimension 527 0.507 0.207 0.000 1.000 
Distance to the political dimension      
Distance to political institutions  614 0.472 0.175 0.025 0.975 
Distance to political elites 608 0.193 0.054 0.013 0.294 
Distance to the cultural dimension 608 0.250 0.123 0.000 0.609 
Distance to the structural dimension 527 0.260 0.102 0.000 0.728 
Gross capital formation 910 24.514 13.808 7.869 219.069 
Inflation 906 4.524 7.018 -4.479 128.419 
Life expectancy 990 72.624 8.953 36.000 84.000 
Legal institutional change 609 -0.003 0.071 -0.287 0.662 
Latitude 990 0.359 0.195 0.014 0.711 
The path-breaking subsample      
GDP per capita growth 898 3.389 4.696 -31.342 33.030 
Legal institutions 650 0.502 0.119 0.139 0.758 
The political dimension      
Political institutions 848 0.505 0.140 0.124 0.764 
Political elites 845 0.501 0.192 0.000 0.935 
The cultural dimension 597 0.686 0.120 0.201 0.885 
The structural dimension 528 0.503 0.190 0.048 1.000 
Distance to the political dimension      
Distance to political institutions  611 0.583 0.133 0.158 1.000 
Distance to political elites 609 0.272 0.095 0.000 0.484 
Distance to the cultural dimension 597 0.392 0.124 0.053 1.000 
Distance to the structural dimension  528 0.358 0.160 0.054 1.000 
Gross capital formation 876 23.895 8.906 0.293 74.822 
Inflation 872 7.841 10.551 -35.837 121.608 
Life expectancy 933  67.401 9.316 36.000 82.000 
Legal institutional change 599 0.006 0.086 -0.393 0.456 
Latitude 936 0.322 0.193 0.011 0.667 
Note: The legal institutional scores, the three dimensions’ measures and distance variables are rescaled to vary 
between 0 and 1.  
 
 Table 2. Mean Values for the Distance Variables, by Mode of Institutional Grafting. 
 
VARIABLES The path-drifting 
subsample 
The path-breaking 
subsample 
t-test for equality of means  
   Mean difference  Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Legal economic institutions  0.672 0.502 0.170 0.000 
Distance to the political dimension     
Distance to political institutions  0.472 0.583 -0.111 0.000 
Distance to political elites 0.193 0.272 -0.079 0.000 
Distance to the cultural dimension 0.250 0.392 -0.142 0.000 
Distance to the structural dimension 0.260 0.358 -0.098 0.000 
  
Table 3. The Distance Variables’ Impact on Economic Growth, by Mode of Institutional Grafting. 
 
VARIABLES The path-drifting subsample  The path-breaking subsample 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Growth)(t – 1) 0.117* 0.025 0.045* 0.021 0.245*** 0.281*** 0.266*** 0.212*** 
 (0.061) (0.069) (0.023) (0.026) (0.059) (0.070) (0.049) (0.033) 
Ln(Capital) 0.301 1.953** 0.118 0.871 -2.574*** -1.504 -1.361** -0.835* 
 (1.098) (0.918) (0.374) (0.575) (0.926) (0.920) (0.658) (0.439) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.124 -0.498*** -0.301*** -0.369*** -0.082 0.022 -0.068 0.071* 
 (0.258) (0.146) (0.061) (0.079) (0.095) (0.082) (0.053) (0.037) 
Distance to the cultural dimension  -23.380***    -3.236***    
 (4.920)    (1.234)    
Distance to the structural dimension  6.118***    -1.314**   
  (1.374)    (0.638)   
Distance to the political dimension         
Distance to political institutions    2.993***    -2.681***  
   (0.854)    (0.972)  
Distance to political elites    0.583    -5.076*** 
    (2.479)    (0.974) 
Number of instruments  21 21 33 33 21 21 21 33 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob 
> chi2) 
0.141 0.180 0.262 0.215 0.356 0.156 0.162 0.185 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.255 0.557 0.455 0.529 0.905 0.660 0.741 0.166 
Number of observations 301 251 258 257 326 295 303 303 
Number of countries 45 42 45 45 45 44 46 46 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. For Model (1) and Model (2) instruments used are from the 
second to the sixth lags of the respective variables. For Model (3) and Model (4), instruments are extended to the ninth lags of the respective variables. In the case of the path-
breaking subsample, we preserve the number of instruments from the second to the sixth lags of the respective variables for Model (3). 
*p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
 Table 4. The Impact of Legal Institutions on Economic Growth, by Mode of Institutional Grafting. 
 
VARIABLES The path-drifting subsample  The path-breaking subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Growth)(t – 1) -0.067*** -0.066* -0.092*** -0.041 0.201*** 0.346*** 0.270*** 0.326*** 
 (0.017) (0.037) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.046) (0.029) (0.039) 
Ln(Capital) 2.270*** 2.004*** 2.498*** 1.266*** -0.402*** -2.027*** -1.644*** -2.473*** 
 (0.337) (0.714) (0.379) (0.354) (0.146) (0.605) (0.324) (0.623) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.412*** -0.540*** -0.360*** -0.641*** 0.017 -0.001 0.004 -0.040 
 (0.042) (0.128) (0.063) (0.096) (0.021) (0.051) (0.034) (0.048) 
Legal institutions  5.958*** 8.620*** 8.440*** 10.440*** 3.518*** 5.128*** 4.182*** 4.629*** 
 (0.721) (1.263) (0.714) (0.661) (0.411) (1.130) (0.744) (1.058) 
Number of instruments  42 29 37 29 42 29 37 29 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.323 0.122 0.287 0.259 0.236 0.150 0.387 0.134 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2)(Pr > z) 
0.890 0.742 0.838 0.798 0.379 0.977 0.689 0.655 
Number of observations 315 315 315 242 340 340 340 310 
Number of countries 45 45 45 33 46 46 46 42 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Model (1): Instruments are from the second to the 
eighth lags of the respective variables. The collapse sub-option is included. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option; Model (2): Time dummies are omitted; Model 
(3): An alternative model specification choice is used such as restricting instruments from the second to the tenth lags of the respective variables; Model (4): Resource 
rich countries are excluded from the analysis. To keep the number of instruments less than the number of countries, we use the specification choice from Model (2) for 
calculating the model’s parameters. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.  
 Table 5. The Impact of Political Institutions’ Quality on Economic Growth, by Mode of Institutional Grafting. 
 
VARIABLES The path-drifting subsample  The path-breaking subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Growth)(t – 1) 0.019 -0.001 0.007 0.037** 0.328*** 0.280*** 0.251*** 0.278*** 
 (0.039) (0.031) (0.025) (0.017) (0.034) (0.031) (0.020) (0.029) 
Ln(Capital) 1.428*** 1.051*** 0.991*** 0.987*** -0.813 0.195 0.204 -0.155 
 (0.525) (0.337) (0.210) (0.207) (0.605) (0.332) (0.138) (0.273) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.457*** -0.081 -0.075 0.056** 0.017 0.026 0.093*** 0.044 
 (0.159) (0.074) (0.052) (0.023) (0.069) (0.049) (0.026) (0.042) 
Political institutions  11.012*** 10.590*** 9.382*** 8.399*** 7.179* -0.305 0.033 -2.029 
 (2.854) (1.513) (1.089) (0.906) (3.718) (2.721) (2.298) (2.367) 
Number of instruments  25 33 41 33 25 33 41 33 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.117 0.123 0.273 0.400 0.104 0.113 0.164 0.215 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr 
> z) 
0.445 0.271 0.316 0.227 0.273 0.235 0.152 0.150 
Number of observations 320 320 320 235 357 357 357 329 
Number of countries 51 51 51 36 49 49 49 45 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments used are from the second to 
the seventh lags of the respective variables. The collapse sub-option is specified; Column (2): Additionally, time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. Instruments are 
reduced to the sixth lags of the respective variables; Column (3): An alternative model specification choice is applied such as using the instruments from the second to 
the eighth lags of the respective variables; Column (4): Resource rich countries are omitted from the analysis, the specification choice from Model (2) is applied with 
instruments reduced to the sixth lags of the respective variables.  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.  
  
Table 6. The Impact of Political Elites’ Quality on Economic Growth, by Mode of Institutional Grafting. 
 
VARIABLES The path-drifting subsample  The path-breaking subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Growth)(t – 1) -0.484** -0.025 -0.100*** -0.307*** -0.181 -0.060** -0.211*** -0.309*** 
 (0.197) (0.010) (0.020) (0.056) (0.158) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) 
Ln(Capital) 1.595 1.109*** 0.401** 0.467 2.015 1.119*** 1.055*** 0.639*** 
 (1.652) (0.304) (0.185) (0.434) (2.755) (0.128) (0.154) (0.137) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.352** 0.160*** 0.176*** 0.080** 0.477*** 0.261*** 0.141*** 0.173*** 
 (0.146) (0.018) (0.017) (0.031) (0.141) (0.026) (0.044) (0.039) 
Political elites -9.616 -1.558** -2.144*** -1.631 13.460* 8.010*** 9.403*** 10.037*** 
 (5.961) (0.653) (0.318) (2.626) (7.484) (0.549) (0.887) (0.777) 
Number of instruments  13 45 35 35 13 46 35 35 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 
(Prob > chi2) 
0.518 0.968 0.701 0.998 0.621 0.794 0.354 0.547 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > 
z) 
0.040 0.297 0.122 0.107 0.945 0.239 0.128 0.118 
Number of observations 320 320 320 235 357 357 357 329 
Number of countries 51 51 51 36 49 49 49 45 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments are restricted to the 
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth lags of the respective variables. The collapse sub-option is included; Column (2): An alternative model specification choice is 
applied such as omitting the collapse sub-option; Column (3): Alternatively, we increase instruments to the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth lags of the respective 
variables and omit the collapse sub-option; Column (4): Resource rich countries are omitted from the analysis. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. 
  
 
Table 7. The Political Dimension’s Impact on Legal Institutional Grafting, by Mode of Institutional Grafting. 
 
VARIABLES The path-drifting subsample  The path-breaking subsample 
 Legal Institutional Scores Legal Institutional Change Legal Institutional Scores Legal Institutional Change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Legal Institutions(t – 1) 0.638*** 0.670*** -0.741*** -0.625*** 0.449*** 0.478*** -1.386*** -1.398*** 
 (0.031) (0.039) (0.030) (0.027) (0.040) (0.046) (0.055) (0.075) 
Life  expectancy  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
The political dimension          
Political institutions  0.027  -0.096***  0.560***  1.302***  
 (0.066)  (0.022)  (0.054)  (0.108)  
Political elites   -0.002  -0.528***  0.106**  0.297*** 
  (0.135)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.074) 
Number of instruments  33 33 43 43 33 33 43 43 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.128 0.116 0.272 0.267 0.133 0.139 0.309 0.253 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2)(Pr > z) 
0.358 0.358 0.722 0.714 0.243 0.583 0.951 0.683 
Number of observations 515 515 515 515 492 492 492 492 
Number of countries 49 49 49 49 48 48 48 48 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. The 
ivstyle option also contains the latitude variable that is considered strictly exogenous. Instruments used are from the fifth to the eleventh lags of the respective variables 
for Model (1) and Model (2) and from the fifth to the twelfth lags of the respective variables for Model (3) and Model (4). 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.   
 
  
Table 8. The Political Dimension’s Impact on the Distance Variables, the Path-Drifting Sub-Sample. 
 
VARIABLES 
Distance to  
the cultural dimension 
Distance to  
the structural dimension  
Distance to 
political 
institutions 
Distance to 
political 
elites 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distance to the cultural dimension(t – 1) 0.541*** 0.573***     
 (0.012) (0.021)     
Distance to the structural dimension(t – 1)   0.392*** 0.318***   
   (0.012) (0.016)   
Distance to political institutions(t – 1)     0.659***  
     (0.066)  
Distance to political elites(t – 1)      -0.104*** 
      (0.038) 
Ln(Capital) -0.074*** -0.079*** 0.279*** 0.303*** -0.146*** -0.054*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.013) 
Ln(Inflation) 0.003*** 0.004*** -0.014*** -0.012*** 0.009*** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
The political dimension       
Political institutions  0.250***  0.392***   0.376*** 
 (0.024)  (0.030)   (0.034) 
Political elites  0.018  1.076*** 1.351***  
  (0.058)  (0.059) (0.205)  
Number of instruments  44 44 42 42 31 31 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.422 0.308 0.334 0.398 0.157 0.210 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.371 0.410 0.104 0.105 0.596 0.263 
Number of observations 419 419 353 353 404 400 
Number of countries 45 45 43 43 47 47 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. 
Instruments used are as follows. In Model (1) and Model (2), instruments are from the second to the ninth lags of the respective variables. In Model (3) and Model (4), 
instruments are from the seventh to the fourteenth lags of the respective variables. In Model (5) and Model (6), instruments are from the fourth to the eighth lags of the 
respective variables.  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.   
  
Table 9. The Political Dimension’s Impact on the Distance Variables, the Path-Breaking Sub-Sample. 
 
VARIABLES 
Distance to  
the cultural dimension 
Distance to  
the structural dimension  
Distance to 
political 
institutions 
Distance to 
political 
elites 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distance to the cultural dimension(t – 1) 0.716*** 0.704***     
 (0.018) (0.018)     
Distance to the structural dimension(t – 1)   0.368*** 0.317***   
   (0.024) (0.019)   
Distance to political institutions(t – 1)     0.476***  
     (0.039)  
Distance to political elites(t – 1)      0.339*** 
      (0.056) 
Ln(Capital) -0.005 -0.006 0.024 -0.048*** -0.053*** -0.014 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.022) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.012*** 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
The political dimension       
Political institutions  -0.164**  1.837***   -0.560*** 
 (0.073)  (0.361)   (0.156) 
Political elites  -0.236***  -1.706*** -0.325***  
  (0.040)  (0.273) (0.109)  
Number of instruments  44 44 32 32 31 31 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.361 0.390 0.123 0.229 0.179 0.268 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.507 0.501 0.211 0.155 0.122 0.341 
Number of observations 428 428 378 378 416 416 
Number of countries 45 45 44 44 46 46 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Time dummies appear in the ivstyle option. 
Instruments used are as follows. In Model (1) and Model (2), instruments are from the second to the ninth lags of the respective variables. In Model (3) and Model (4), 
instruments are from the first to the fifth lags of the respective variables. In Model (5) and Model (6), instruments are from the fourth to the eighth lags of the 
respective variables. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.   
  
Table 10. Interactions between the Political dimension and Distances in their Impact on Economic Growth, by Mode of Institutional Grafting. 
 
VARIABLES The path-drifting subsample  The path-breaking subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Growth)(t – 1) -0.059*** -0.099*** 0.067*** 0.116*** 0.276*** 0.236*** 0.240*** 0.298*** 
 (0.009) (0.029) (0.012) (0.027) (0.023) (0.028) (0.019) (0.030) 
Ln(Capital) 1.372*** 1.146*** 0.438*** 0.754*** 0.497** 0.324** 1.021*** 0.457* 
 (0.220) (0.315) (0.098) (0.289) (0.228) (0.158) (0.107) (0.272) 
Ln(Inflation) -0.291*** -0.279*** 0.004 -0.039 0.009 0.092*** -0.048 -0.062 
 (0.062) (0.067) (0.047) (0.073) (0.028) (0.032) (0.036) (0.055) 
Distance to the cultural -26.240*** -33.770***   -3.895** -4.231**   
dimension (3.785) (5.046)   (1.652) (1.932)   
Distance to the structural    -5.058* -24.780***   -7.265*** -7.967*** 
dimension   (2.945) (3.337)   (1.223) (2.132) 
Political institutions  -2.497**  -4.384**  1.765  -0.846  
 (1.101)  (2.039)  (2.567)  (1.572)  
Political elites  -21.620***  -39.840***  -10.710***  -11.760*** 
  (4.561)  (5.430)  (2.420)  (2.426) 
Distance to culture X 46.690***    11.550***    
X Political institutions  (6.612)    (2.863)    
Distance to culture X  71.560***    11.490***   
X Political elites  (10.920)    (3.457)   
Distance to structure X   23.050***    18.670***  
X Political institutions    (5.037)    (1.982)  
Distance to structure X    75.870***    21.060*** 
X Political elites    (7.282)    (3.598) 
Number of instruments  43 43 43 37 43 43 43 37 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions  0.357 0.312 0.465 0.493 0.251 0.231 0.368 0.245 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)(Pr > z) 0.483 0.819 0.376 0.505 0.306 0.251 0.214 0.431 
Number of observations 252 252 211 211 294 294 267 267 
Number of countries 45 45 45 45 44 44 44 44 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All the variables specified in the model are included in the gmmstyle option. Instruments used are from the second to the eighth 
lags of the respective variables. The collapse sub-option is included.  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.  
 Appendix 1. List of Countries Used in the Analysis. 
 
The path-drift subsample The path-breaking subsample 
Australia  Laos PDR Albania  Lesotho  
Austria  Luxembourg  Argentina  Liberia 
Bahrain  Mauritius  Armenia Lithuania 
Belgium  Mexico Bangladesh Macedonia 
Botswana Morocco Benin Madagascar 
Cameroon  Netherlands, the Bhutan Malawi 
Canada New Zealand  Bolivia Mali 
China  Norway  Brazil Moldova 
Colombia  Oman  Bulgaria Mongolia 
Costa Rica  Papua New Guinea  Burundi Mozambique 
Cyprus Portugal  Cabo Verde  Nicaragua 
Denmark  Rwanda  Chile Panama 
Djibouti Saudi Arabia  Congo, Dem. Rep. Paraguay 
Dominican Republic Singapore Croatia Philippines 
Egypt Sri Lanka  Czech Republic Poland 
Equatorial Guinea Swaziland El Salvador  Romania 
Finland Sweden  Estonia Russia 
France Switzerland  Georgia Serbia 
Germany Syria  Guatemala Sierra Leone 
Greece Trinidad & Tobago Guyana  Slovak Rep. 
Guinea Tunisia  Hungary Slovenia 
India Turkmenistan Indonesia Taiwan  
Ireland United Arab Emirates Kenya Ukraine  
Israel United Kingdom, the Korea South  Uruguay 
Italy United States, the Kyrgyzstan  Zambia  
Jamaica Uzbekistan Latvia  
Japan Vietnam    
Kazakhstan    
Note: Some of these countries lack data on institutional or political indexes, which results in a smaller 
number of countries actually used in each type of analysis. 
 
